Monday, June 16, 2003 :::
Motion for Readmission
Robbin Stewart
Attorney Number 14174-53 ?
I was suspended as of May 18 2003 from the practice of law in Indiana.
I have paid a total of $200 and completed 12 hours of CLEs.
I move for readmission.
If it is possible, I wish to be readmitted retroactively to May 18.
Respectfully submitted,
Robbin Stewart
227 N Temple
Indianapolis In 46201
::: posted by gt at 2:57 PM
Monday, June 02, 2003 :::
http://www.marciaoddi.com/indianalawblog/
Indiana decisions - Construction of political advertising statute
The 7th Circuit Court of Appeals, in the case of Brian Majors et al. v. Marsha Bell, et al., decided 1/23/03, reversed the federal District Court's decision dismissing the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Judge Posner wrote the opinion:
An Indiana statute, challenged in this suit as an infringement of free speech, requires that political advertising that “expressly advocat[es] the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate” include “adequate notice of the identity of persons who paid for . . . the communication,” Ind. Code §§ 3-9-3-2.5(b)(1), (d), and makes violation a misdemeanor. * * * On its face, the Indiana statute applies to all persons who pay for political advertising that expressly advocates the election or defeat of a particular candidate. The defendants (various state and local election officials) argue to us as they did to the district judge that a proper interpretation of “persons” limits the term to candidates, their committees, and the committees’ agents. But no Indiana court has so interpreted the statute—nor did the district judge, who said only that “apparently” it was so limited. The website of the Indiana Election Commission, http://www.in.gov/sos/pdfs/Disclaim.pdf (May 2002), does not contain the limiting interpretation, but on the contrary says that the statute applies to “individuals, organizations, or committees who purchase advertisement time or space or circulate or publish material in support of or in opposition to a candidate, a political party, or a public question” and indeed to “all individuals and political organizations” who do any of these things (emphasis added).
Finding that the suit should not have been dismised on jurisdictional grounds, the court turned to its merits:
Although the parties prudently have briefed the merits, we think it would be premature for us to decide them. For they may depend on the meaning of the challenged statute, which only the Indiana courts can determine authoritatively. If the statute is as narrow as the defendants claim it is, it is a straightforward antifraud statute unlikely to present serious constitutional problems. For on their interpretation it merely forbids the candidate and his organization to create the impression that independent voices support him or oppose his opponent, when in fact the voices are those of the candidate himself, playing ventriloquist. * * * But if instead as the plaintiffs argue the statute reaches all persons, then it is a blanket prohibition of anonymous campaign-related speech (unless the speech is costless, for it is only the identity of the payor of political advertising that is required to be disclosed), and thus puts a crimp in political speech by exposing persons who want to express themselves for or against a particular candidate to the risk of retaliation. * * * Several courts have * * * upheld statutes materially identical to the Indiana statute broadly interpreted to reach “all persons.” * * *
The fact that the state in our case is advocating the narrow reading of its statute indicates its awareness that if broadly interpreted, * * * the statute may be unconstitutional. The statutory language supports the broad interpretation, but literal interpretations are often rejected when necessary to save a statute from being held unconstitutional.
We therefore certify to the Indiana Supreme Court, pursuant to 7th Cir. R. 52 and Ind. Code § 33-2-4-1, the following question, upon the answer to which the further proceedings in this appeal will depend:
Is the term “persons” in Ind. Code §§ 3-9-3-2.5(b)(1), (d) limited to candidates, authorized political committees or subcommittees of candidates, and the agents of such committees or subcommittees, or does it have a broader scope, and, if so, how much broader?
This certified question was argued before the Indiana Supreme Court on 5/29/03 (last Thursday). Thanks to the Indiana Court's Oral Arguments Online feature, you may watch the argument via Real Video. Click here to go to the Court's list of May 2003 webcasts, then scroll down to Brian Majors v. Marsha Abell.
Today's Indianapolis Star had comprehensive coverage of this issue in a story by the Star's political reporter, Mary Beth Schneider, titled "What's a person? Court must decide in political-ads suit: Definition will help determine disclosure rules for buying political ads." The story begins:
You may think you know what "a person" is. You may think everyone knows what "a person" is. But right now, Indiana's five Supreme Court justices are debating it, and the answer -- which eventually could come from the U.S. Supreme Court -- could have far-reaching consequences for elections in Indiana and across the nation.
The state's highest court got into the definition business at the request of the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in Chicago. Under Indiana law, a person who spends money on political advertising must disclose his or her identity. At issue is whether that applies to everybody, or just to candidates and political committees.
If the state Supreme Court decides that a person is, well, any person, the federal court may be poised to declare Indiana's entire law an unconstitutional restriction of free speech. If the state court decides that, at least in this statute, a person is a political candidate and the committee trying to elect him or her, Indiana's law would be gutted, said Julia Vaughn, policy director for the citizens lobbying group Common Cause/Indiana.
Posted by Marcia Oddi at 05:44 PM
May 31, 2003
::: posted by gt at 5:37 PM
